四是防止排放权交易价格大起大落。在市场建立初期，特别是在不允许跨期储存和预支情况下，设定排放权交易价格上下限，有利于市场的平稳运行。保留部分排放权政府储备，也有利于增加灵活性，在市场需求过高时平抑价格，防止企业在短期内减排成本急剧上升。但排放权储备应控制在一定限度内，给市场以稳定的预期。

　　在我国，发改委等部门鼓励有条件的地区和行业开展碳排放权交易，但应有大体统一的规则，防止市场价格过大波动而影响市场运行。各地企业往往担心减排成本高而要求更多排放权，地方政府若过于随意、过多地动用排放权储备，势必导致排放权价格剧烈波动。如果过早地开发衍生产品，现货价格波动导致衍生品价格更大波动，将严重影响市场运行和减排成效。因此，排放权储备的规模设定应以较准确的统计和测算为基础，其发放应遵循严格、透明的程序。

作者：（王信  袁方）

注：

[1]如英国自愿碳排放权交易机制始于2002年，但由于政府未设定最高排放目标，企业往往与管理部门博弈最高排放限额，该交易机制并不成功（唐莉 2010）。

[2] HHI等于一个行业中各企业占行业总收入或总资产百分比的平方和，反映市场中企业规模的离散度。某产业内企业数量越多，规模越接近，HHI就越接近0。

[3]截至2010年7月，北京、上海交易所CDM项目分别成交3个和26个，成交量分别为41万和120万吨；北京、上海、天津交易所自愿减排项目分别成交4个、35个和2个，交易量分别为34万、27万和7万吨（蒋兆理 2010）。

参考文献:

蒋兆理，2010，在中国人民银行、天津市政府主办的“全球低碳金融高层论坛”上的发言，天津，9月10日。

桑德尔，2010，在中国人民银行、天津市政府主办的“全球低碳金融高层论坛”上的演讲，天津，9月10日。

唐莉，2010，在中国人民银行、天津市政府主办的“全球低碳金融高层论坛”上的发言，天津，9月10日。   

  

王毅刚，2010,《中国碳排放交易体系设计研究》，中国社会科学院研究生院博士学位论文。

Aluman, Markus, Dallas Burtraw, Joseph Kruger, and Lars Zetterberg, 2007, “The Ten-year Rule: Allocation of Emission Allowances in the EU Emission Trading System,” Energy Policy35 (3), 1718-1730.

Brinkman, Marcel, Samuel Fankhauser, Ben Irons and Stephan Weyers, 2009, “The carbon market in 2020: volumes, prices and gains from trade,” Centre for Climate Change Economics and Policy Working Paper No. 13, Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment Working Paper No. 11 

Convery, Frank, and Luke Redmond, 2007, “Market and Price Developments in the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme,” Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, (2007) 1(1): 88-111.

Capoor, Karan, and Philippe Ambrosi, 2006-2009, “State and Trends of the Carbon Market 2006-2009,” World Bank Institute, Washington, DC.

Ellerman, Denny, 2008, “The EU’S Emissions Trading Scheme: A Proto-type Global System,” Harvard Project on International Climate Agreements.

Ellerman, Denny, and Barbara Buchner, 2007, “The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme: Origins, Allocation, and Early Results,” Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, (2007) 1(1): 66-87.

Ellerman, Denny, Barbara Buchner, and Carlo Carraro, 2007, “Allocation in the European Emissions Trading Scheme: Rights, Rents, and Fairness,” Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ellerman, Denny, and Paul Joskow, 2008, “The European Union’s Emissions Trading System in Perspective,” Report for the Pew Center on Global Climate Change, Arlington, VA. 

Friedman, Lee, and Jeff Deason, 2009, “Should the Regulator or the Market Decide When to Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions?” The Economists' Voice, vol6, issue 13.

Fankhauser, Sam and Cameron Hepburn, 2009, “Carbon markets in space and time,” Vivid Economics report for UK Department of Energy and Climate Change, available at http://www.decc.gov.uk/en/content/cms/what_we_do/change_energy/tackling_clima/emissions/emissions.aspx., Henry and Denny Ellerman, 2004, “The safety valve and climate policy,” Energy Policy, 32, 481-491.

Jacoby

Kruger, Joseph, Wallace Oates, and William Pizer, 2007, “Decentralization in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme and Lessons for Global Policy,” Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, (2007) 1(1): 112-133.

Larson, Donald, Philippe Ambrosi, Ariel Dinar, Shaikh Rahman, and Rebecca Entler, 2008, “Carbon Markets, Institutions, Policies, and Research,” World Bank Policy Reseach Working Paper No. 4761.

Murray, Brian, Richard Newell, and William Pizer, 2008, “Balancing Cost and Emissions Certainty,” Resources for the Future Discussion Paper 08-24. 

Point Carbon, 2009, “Carbon 2009: Emission Trading Coming Home,” London: Point Carbon, available at http://www.pointcarbon.com/research/carbonmarketresearch/analyst/1.1083366 

U.S. Congress, 2009, “American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009,” H.R. 2454, 111th Congress.